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The paper presents labour supply scenarios in France, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom for the years 2025 and 2050. These projections were based on 
the examination of the dynamics of the major contributing factors to the labour 
supply (LS), i.e. working-age population (WAP), labour force participation rate 
(LFPR), employment rate (ER) and labour utilisation (LU; defined as time 
worked per worker per year). The assumptions underlying the scenarios varied 
from plausible to ‘best case scenario’ to unrealistic. In France and in the United 
Kingdom, the demographic factors coupled with continuing immigration at the 
current levels will shape only a marginal decrease of the size of WAP. By 
contrast, the size of Germany’s and Italy’s WAP will shrink significantly by 2025 
and, barring a tremendous surge in immigration, greatly by mid-century. In order 
to sustain the supply of labour, Italy has to eliminate unemployment. This 
assumes the sustainability of such factors as the recent increase in LFPR 
(especially of women) and relatively large immigration. By contrast, Germany 
has a large potential for increasing labour utilisation. Unless, however, 
immigration is increased dramatically, this will not suffice to balance the impact 
of the WAP decrease on LS. Within varying degrees, governments are able to 
affect the components of labour supply and capitalise on eventual synergies. The 
analysis relies on data from the United Nations Population Division, OECD, ILO 
and the European Union.  
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1  Introduction 
It might seem odd to raise the issue of looming labour shortages in the time of 
massive unemployment. One may argue, however, that large-scale unemployment 
is transitory while demographic trends are resilient.  
The next two decades belie labour force dynamics that are completely 
determined by past population reproduction, save migration inflows. Capital and 
technology as factors of production command most attention when the 
demographics of the labour force are steady and satisfactory, while population 
declines tend to shift the focus towards labour.  
This paper focuses on the projected contraction of working-age populations 
(WAP) in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as on the 
options to sustain the supply of labour (LS). As all papers in this domain, it starts 
with an exposition of the largely unavoidable demographic results of low fertility. 
The potentials of immigration, increased participation in the labour force and 
employment to balance the negative demographic developments are considered. 
In addition to these factors, this paper includes labour utilisation (working 
time) as a determinant of labour supply. This factor has been built into some 
models (e.g. Boulhol 2009), which focused on current inter-country variations 
rather than future developments. Our projection scenarios explicitly point to 
adjustment options that are differently suited to actual combinations of 
demographic and non-demographic factors. Comparing four large countries of the 
European Union that significantly differ with respect to all included variables 
serves to further sharpen the results.  
The 1-10 year horizons that are typically used for employment projections are 
appropriate for appraising the trends that are driven by economic factors only or 
with respect to official goals such as the Lisbon strategy (Feld 2006). 
Demography provides a much longer-term vision that may yield different results. 
Looking at a more distant future is important, as the contraction of the labour 
force (which has already begun) will greatly accelerate in the future, and 
especially in the second quarter of the century.  
Long-term projections make sense, because the trends in WAP during 2025-
2050 will be determined and based essentially on fertility assumptions for the 
2010-2035 period, migration patterns notwithstanding. There are only minor 
disagreements among experts about these assumptions.  
Relevant demographic trends include population ageing and the negative 
growth (i.e. decrease) of the population in total (depopulation) or of particular age 
groups. Sometimes ageing is supposed to be synonymous with population decline. 
In fact, no peaceful contraction of population takes place without ageing; 
population decline follows and accompanies advanced ageing. However, ageing 
itself does not necessarily entail negative population growth. The whole 
demographic transition is associated with increasing the population’s median age, Serguey Ivanov 
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which, in essence, is ‘ageing’. It follows that using the terms ‘ageing’ and 
‘population decrease’ interchangeably is incorrect.  
While ageing is a very significant process affecting the supply of labour in its 
own right, here it is dealt with only tangentially. The supply of labour is 
determined by demographic and economic factors. The demographic factors 
consist of the natural reproduction of the labour force and migrations. Among 
economic factors, the most important are the inclusion of the relevant age and sex 
groups into labour force, the actual employment of the labour force and the extent 
of use of potentially available working time.  
It is not our goal to impose a view that a contracting labour supply is an 
inherently negative phenomenon. There is an opinion that this is not even a 
problematic issue because the economy will simply adjust to a smaller labour 
force through diminished consumer demand. Besides, the capital-work ratio will 
increase, spurring productivity growth. From the vantage point of global 
sustainable development a smaller national economy is beneficial. Several 
counterarguments, however, can be advanced.  
The world of contracting national economies may be a hospitable world, yet it 
will definitively sail in uncharted waters. For instance, negative population 
growth may limit economic output of the European Union economies, while the 
steadily increasing labour supply in the United States will serve to fuel its 
economic growth. Conversely, demographics may become a powerful stimulus 
for creating new engines of growth for the economies of Europe. New and 
unknown challenges may arise from the coexistence of contracting and expanding 
economies within integrated economic spaces such as the European Union. 
Shrinking national budgets may call for new criteria and new regulations for the 
public sector. 
According to the European Commission, a massive decline in the number of 
employed people will have a huge impact on the overall economic growth, the 
functioning of the internal market and the competitiveness of the firms on the 
European Union (European Commission 2005). Sustained negative economic 
growth presents fundamental ideological and macroeconomic challenges. Modern 
economies function on the presumption of expansion; they are fundamentally 
oriented to growth and every deviation from the ascending path is universally 
blamed for hurting economic growth. Governments, businesses, civil society and 
media—we all share the paradigm that growth is benign, that decline is 
malignant, that expansion is healthy and contraction is morbid, that growing gross 
domestic product equals prosperity, and that a dropping output spells weakness, 
crisis and hardship.  
Sustaining the usual pace of economic growth when labour supply is 
shrinking may be achieved through accelerated growth of labour productivity. 
This would be a challenging task. Since a portion (and, under particular 
conditions, quite a large portion) of incremental labour productivity will be ‘used’ Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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to offset the losses of labour supply, the remainder may not suffice to assure 
economic growth.  
There may be other specific arguments against a contracting labour force. 
Working-age populations are contracting faster than general populations, which 
depresses the production per capita and, therefore, average well-being. Despite 
the signs of population change, ageing creates additional demand for labour-
intensive services, thereby compounding the deficit and draining other sectors.  
A shrinking population means shrinking markets with lower demand for 
labour. Yet, labour supply to some large economic sectors, such as physical 
infrastructure, is inelastic. As a result, the effect of a large-scale contraction of the 
labour force may not be limited to just a downsizing of the economy, but could 
provoke serious imbalances. In addition, in several sectors the systematic 
contractions of the labour force should be followed by a decommissioning of 
productive capacities, in turn causing significant economic losses.  
We will not, however, delve much deeper into these issues, for our goal here 
is different. It is to demonstrate how the demographic factors depress the supply 
of labour and how the economic factors may be used to balance this contraction. 
It follows that, within this text, such adjectives as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ should 
only be interpreted within the context of the perspective described above.  
We combine brief overviews of the trends in the factors of labour supply with 
scenarios for the future that are based on a series of demographic and economic 
assumptions. Labour supply (LS) is projected as employed labour force (LF) and 
total time worked in the national economy (TT). Four indicators are factored into 
the projections: working-age population (WAP) defined as population aged 
15-64; labour force participation rates (LFPR, or economic activity rates); 
employment rates (ER) and labour utilisation (LU). The latter is defined as time 
worked per worker per year. Hence, WAP is the function of natural reproduction 
of population and net migration, whereas LS may be decomposed either as 
 
LF =  WAP ⋅ LFPR ⋅ ER ,or 
 
TT = LF ⋅ LU 
 
The interactions between migrations and the natural reproduction of a 
population are incorporated in the demographic projection model. On the 
contrary, we did not estimate other interactions in spite of the fact that they are 
relevant to projecting labour supply. Some of these interactions are cursorily 
touched upon in the last section.  
Past population estimates and five variants of population projections 
(medium, low, high and constant-fertility, all with migration, as well as a medium 
variant without migration) come from World Population Prospects DEMOBASE 
of the United Nations Population Division. Other variants have been generated by 
applying different assumptions to DEMOBASE data. Unless indicated otherwise, Serguey Ivanov 
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labour statistics are from OECDStat. Net migration is presented in absolute 
numbers. WAP, LF and TT are normalised as indices with the baseline in 2010. 
Estimates are framed by 2005-2010 at the high end and 1970 or 1985 at the 
low end. The benchmark year is 2010. Technically, 2010 is still in the future. 
However, these differences are minor and the ensuing uncertainty has so little 
impact on our computations that it is ignored. The simulation scenarios are 
presented for two points in time: 2025 and 2050. The latter date is the horizon of 
the United Nations population projections. It is a fact that the mid-century is not 
that extravagant a time horizon even for non-demographic trends, as governments 
do develop practical plans for such time frames. For instance, the United 
Kingdom adopted a scheme of shifting the retirement age by 2046. The former 
date (2025) is chosen because the youngest already born cohort will enter into 
working age some time around 2025 and the labour supply will, therefore, not be 
affected by future fertility until that date.  
We use a simple sequence of steps to evaluate the demographic trends and to 
estimate the options to balance their outcomes. First, we explore what the supply 
of labour would be, provided that it is driven by fertility only, everything else 
being held constant. Then we estimate the impact of three migration scenarios: 
zero migration, net migration factored into the United Nations projections 
(roughly equivalent to the observed net migration prior to recent hikes) and the 
migration needed to stabilise WAP. At the third stage, we assess the extent to 
which higher aggregate levels of labour participation (resulting essentially from 
the recent increase of female labour  could, if sustained during the lifespan and 
across cohorts, offset the contraction of WAP or even become a substitute for 
immigration. Fourthly, we address the impact of unemployment on the 
availability of labour. Finally, we open the subject of labour utilisation as a source 
for closing the gap in labour supply created by demographic trends. This leads to 
a discussion on selected policy implications.  
Indeed, aggregate indicators yield very rough and perhaps biased estimates 
because all labour characteristics are age- and gender-specific while the age 
structure of the labour force is changing. The ILO, OECD and the European 
Central Bank use refined methodologies to project labour force participation 
disaggregated by age and sex (see overview in Carone 2005). However, in order 
to consistently apply this approach within the scope of this paper would entail 
disaggregating all parameters of labour supply, including time worked. The data 
on average workweek by sex and age are available from Eurostat, but converting 
them into explicit estimates of time worked per year would require using 
assumptions that might be too bold. This paper circumvents this difficulty by not 
attempting to disaggregate all parameters. Instead, we try to combine (a) our own 
estimates of the aggregate WAP resulting from age-sex distributions, both with 
and without net migration (b) aggregate LFPR projections implemented by a 
cohort approach (Carone 2005) and (c) aggregate levels of ER and LU from 
OECDStat, which are implicitly based on age-sex specific rates. The results Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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obtained by Carone (2005) are based on Eurostat population projections and, 
therefore, are not exactly compatible with age-sex distributions from United 
Nations population projections, yet these discrepancies are marginal. The 
assumptions of stable future ER and LU used for the benchmark scenarios are 
likely to be more biased since ageing tends to depress these indicators. We did not 
attempt to introduce corrections for these biases.  
 
 
2  Fertility 
The dynamics of working-age populations are shaped by fertility, mortality and 
migrations. Together with the population size and age structure fertility 
determines the size of WAP. Moreover, age structure itself is primarily 
determined by fertility. Increased child, adolescent and adult survival rates in the 
second half of the 20th century did contribute to WAP growth in all of the four 
European countries. This impact, however, falls outside the scope of this paper 
because in the future the role of mortality decline in these ages is likely to become 
marginal. The role of international migrations is country-specific.  
Over the last 60 years there have been dissimilarities of fertility trends, yet it 
is the commonalities that have prevailed (Figure 1). Most Western countries have 
experienced transient simultaneous fertility increases that culminated in the baby 
boom. Around 1960, fertility was significantly higher than replacement level in 
all four countries ranging from 2.4 in Italy and Germany to 2.8 in France and the 
United Kingdom. Since the mid-1960s in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, and after since the early 1970s in Italy, fertility has been falling 
precipitously. In the mid-1980s, in France and the United Kingdom the decline 
has halted and total fertility has stabilised at 1.8-1.9.  
This recovery is driven by the near-completion of the transition from early to 
late childbearing (i.e, diminishing tempo effect) as well as by some quantum 
effects caused by economic factors. This leads to the expectation that in the 
lowest-low fertility countries, cohort and (with a lag) period fertility will re-enter 
the 1.5-1.8 band. The assumptions underlying the medium variant of the United 
Nations population projections (Table  1) are completely consistent with this 
approach. By European standards fertility of about 1.9, as in France and the 
United Kingdom, is comfortable albeit below replacement level. The medium 
variant is based on the assumption that in the lowest-low fertility countries (such 
as in Germany and in Italy), period fertility will increase monotonically until it 

























Source: Eurostat online statistics database and national statistical offices 
 
 
There are no reasons to expect them to rise in the future beyond diminishing 
tempo effects. In contrast, Italy and Germany sank to the depth of fertility bust: in 
the mid-1990s TFR in both countries declined to 1.2. In Italy, TFR remained 
below 1.3 for more than a decade.  
Until recently, the prevailing expectation was that lowest-low fertility is likely 
to last several decades (Kohler et al. 2006), because the decline of period rates 
was not limited to a transitory tempo effect but also fuelled by a contracting 
quantum. In fact fertility trends have reversed recently in low fertility countries. 
Fertility has risen in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom and to a lesser 
extent in France.  
Such increases are compatible with the analyses of period-cohort interaction 
effects of postponement (e.g. Sobotka 2004) as well as the plausible immigration 
from the higher-fertility countries, even though these effects are not explicitly 
factored in. In the medium-low fertility countries, period fertility will change only 
marginally: by decreasing by 0.04 in France and by increasing by 0.01 in the 
United Kingdom. The difference between the high and the low variants is one 
child per woman, while the medium variant is equidistant from the extremes.  




Period total fertility rate according to United Nations Population Estimates and 
Projections, 2008 Revision  
Country Variant  2005-20102010-20152015-20202020-20252025-2030  2030-2035 
Germany  Constant  fertility  1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 
  High  1.32 1.59 1.79 1.94 1.99 2.04 
  Low  1.32 1.09 0.99 0.94 0.99 1.04 
  Medium  1.32 1.34 1.39 1.44 1.49 1.54 
France  Constant  fertility  1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 
  High  1.89 2.10 2.25 2.35 2.35 2.35 
  Low  1.89 1.60 1.45 1.35 1.35 1.35 
  Medium  1.89 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 
Italy  Constant  fertility  1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 
  High  1.38 1.66 1.84 1.99 2.04 2.09 
  Low  1.38 1.16 1.04 0.99 1.04 1.09 
  Medium  1.38 1.41 1.44 1.49 1.54 1.59 
United  Kingdom  Constant  fertility  1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 
  High  1.84 2.10 2.25 2.35 2.35 2.35 
  Low  1.84 1.60 1.45 1.35 1.35 1.35 
  Medium  1.84 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 
Source: United Nations, DEMOBASE 
 
Immigration from higher-fertility countries of the South lifts, sometimes 
significantly, fertility levels in the receiving countries. The average fertility of 
foreign-born women is typically higher than that of native women (Toulemon 
2004) and sometimes even higher than the average level in their country of origin 
(Haug et al. 2002). Larger flows of immigration from the South would, therefore, 
impact on receiving populations directly by adding inhabitants, and indirectly by 
disproportionately increasing the number of births. This effect is not factored into 
the United Nations population projections, where immigration is not apportioned 
by sending countries and the fertility rates of the receiving country are instantly 
applied to the newcomers.  
The observation that in selected developed countries fertility trends have 
recently reversed has prompted more audacious explanations. According to 
Myrskylä et al. (2009) the j-shaped curve that relates total fertility to the human 
development index, implies that at the highest edge of socio-economic 
development fertility tends to increase more and faster than the rate factored into 
the medium variant of the United Nations projections. This hypothesis focuses on 
period fertility and is based entirely on the underlying assumption that 
development raises the number of wanted children, rather than on the evidence of 
postponement-recuperation effects or impacts of immigration from higher fertility 
countries. Micro-level studies suggest that fertility desires have somewhat 
strengthened in certain most advanced countries, but in a more restricted 
magnitude than needed for replacement. This results from childbearing-friendly Serguey Ivanov 
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societal conditions, rather than merely from the improvements in wealth, health 
and education that are captured in the human development index. This is why this 
ascending trend is not universal and it may be wiser to assume that fertility in 
Italy and Germany could increase more than factored into the medium variant of 




3  Migrations 
With respect to immigration, a consistent series of estimates of an acceptable 
quality (albeit of different length) are available for all four countries (Figure 2). 
By contrast, emigration data are available only for Germany and the United 
Kingdom; however, circumstantial evidence and indirect estimates of emigration 
allow estimating the trends of net migration for all four countries.  
During the three decades after World War II, France was a net recipient of 
migrants with mostly flat and low (in comparison with the country’s population) 
levels, which were interrupted by hikes following the end of colonial rule in 
Indochina and Africa. Net migration for the other three countries during that 
period was erratic. Out-migration prevailed and the sign and volume of net 
migration were determined mostly by emigration. The situation changed since the 
1980s, as immigration surged in all four countries. Net migration to Germany 
attained its peak in the first half of the 1990s with massive waves of migrants 
from the former Soviet Union; it has since subsided. A similar surge of 
immigration fuelled by strong inflows of migrants from the South happened in 
Italy a decade later; it is unlikely to run out unless limited by the policies of the 
host country. Net-migration to the United Kingdom was increasing steadily (albeit 
not as abruptly) essentially because of the large influxes of immigrants from the 
Commonwealth and later from eastern Europe. France has also experienced a 
brief hike in the first half of the 2000s.  
International migration already assumes the primary role in population 
reproduction. Since 1980, the net migration inflow into Germany has reached 6.9 
million persons; during the same period, net immigration has added 4.3 million 
people to the population of Italy. Without these inflows of migrants, WAP would 
have started to contract much earlier and its current size would be smaller than it 
actually is (4 per cent in Germany and 8 per cent in Italy).  
In 1996-2006, the total population of France was growing at an annualised 
rate of 5.7 per thousand; net migration contributed three-quarters to this growth. 
In Germany and Italy, the positive net migration overcompensated for the 
negative natural increase and secured a slow total population increase in Germany 
(0.6 per thousand per year) and a rapid growth in Italy (4.8 per thousand) (OECD 
2009). By 2006 the share of the foreign-born attained 8 per cent in France, 10 per 
cent in the United Kingdom and 13 per cent in Germany. Undoubtedly, labour Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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migration has an even greater impact on the reproduction of WAP, since 
migration inflows tend to consist primarily of workers. 
With respect to international migrations, the past is not a particularly robust 
predictor of the future. Unlike fertility and mortality, migration has little inertia 
and is more responsive to direct public interventions. This is why migration 
assumptions are the weakest part of demographic projections. There is, however, 
no way around migration hypotheses for national populations. The United Nations 
postulates that the net migration will decrease during the next five years and then 
stabilise at (arbitrarily chosen) levels that are significantly higher than those 
prevailing before the recent hikes: 100,000 per year in France, 150,000 in Italy, 
110,000 in Germany and 170,000 in the United Kingdom.  
 
Figure 2:  





















































Note: Inflow data based on population registers 
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2008 Edition, Table A.1.1 
 
 
Purely as an arbitrarily adjusted extrapolation of the past, such an approach is 
as good as any alternative one. It is, in fact, based on a correct interpretation of 
international migrations as a product of so many short-term factors that it would 
be futile trying to foresee their developments even for the near future, let alone for 
decades from now. Instead of trying to do so, the extrapolative approach ignores 
the determinants of migrations and either freezes the (adjusted) absolute numbers, 
as is assumed in the United Nations projections, or selects a straight line as a 
trend. In either option, the increase of the role of migration (measured, e.g., by the Serguey Ivanov 
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net migration rate) in the population reproduction of below-replacement countries 
becomes a by-product of projections. Replacement migration approach is 
different. As will be demonstrated below, one should expect a strengthening need 
for immigration determined by long-term foreseeable demographic changes.  
 
 
4  Working-age population 
The standard age brackets of WAP (from 15 to 64 years) are adequate for the 
purpose of this paper. 15-17 year-olds are rarely employed since the youngest 
legal age at employment is 16. On the other hand, internationally comparable data 
on the age group 18-19 are hard to find. Yet, it would be unwise to forsake the 
15-19 age group altogether on the grounds that its majority is irrelevant for the 
task at hand. Undeniably, labour force participation of teenagers is decreasing as a 
result of universal enrolment in secondary education and the expansion of tertiary 
education, but it still remains non-negligible. 
We have chosen the typical statutory age at retirement for men (65 years) as 
the upper limit of WAP. In fact, people (and women in particular) often do retire 
at younger ages. Yet, we retain the higher age as the upper limit of WAP because 
the recent trend has been toward increasing the statutory retirement age with the 
ostensible goal of retaining more seniors in the labour force. While this trend is 
likely to continue (as well as the trend of the gender gap to close), making 
elaborate hypotheses about the unfolding of this process is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Although non-negligible proportions of people beyond statutory 
retirement age do keep working, the decrease of LFPR after age 64 is steep.  
The evolution of WAP in the second half of the past century was determined 
by relatively young yet ageing age structures, by the initially high but 
subsequently declining fertility, and by the ups and downs of migration flows. 
The resulting trends were those of uninterrupted yet decelerating growth until 
1990 in Italy, until 2000 in Germany and until 2010 in France, while WAP in the 
United Kingdom keeps growing (Figure  3). From 1970 to 2010, WAP has 
increased by 28 per cent in France and by 10-17 per cent in the other three 
countries. WAP is poised to fall precipitously in Italy and Germany. In France all 
demographics are smoother and so will be the contraction of WAP. In the United 
Kingdom the combination of high fertility and robust immigration will fuel the 
growth of WAP until the end of the projection period.  
Combinations of fertility variants with different influxes of migrants yield 
instructive projections. For all four countries, net migration is assumed to be 
either nil or at the level factored into the United Nations population projections. 
For Germany and Italy, where WAP will be particularly affected by low fertility, 
an additional set of projections is run where net migration is assumed to remain at 
a level approximately sufficient to maintain WAP (third line in each panel of 
Table 2). Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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If fertility remains at 1.8 children per woman and net migration at the levels 
assumed by the United Nations, then by 2025 WAP will decrease by a modest one 
per cent in France and increase by (an also trivial) 4 per cent in the United 
Kingdom. In the following quarter-century, nothing dramatic will happen either: 
WAP in France will lose just four more percentage points, while gaining four 
more in the United Kingdom.  
During the next 25 years, migration will make a big difference for both 
countries and especially for the United Kingdom, where maintaining net 
migration at the current level (170 thousand per year) will assure healthy growth 
of WAP under all fertility assumptions, except for the low-fertility variant. Even 
there, however, WAP will lose only 3 per cent. By contrast, the zero-migration 
scenario yields a 20 per cent decrease of WAP. 
 
Figure 3: 











































Source: United Nations, DEMOBASE (medium variant) 
 
 
In France maintaining immigration at 100,000 per year could not prevent a 
mild contraction of WAP. In order to sustain WAP at the 2010 level, immigration 
ought to be increased by 30 per cent. If, on the other hand, net migration were to 
wear out, then by 2050 WAP is likely to decrease, though only by 10 per cent. 
This relatively low estimate is due to high fertility. The impact of migration on 
WAP is significantly lower in France than in the United Kingdom: the zero 
migration scenario produces, by 2050, a 6-percentage-point smaller WAP in 
France, compared with a 20-percentage-point difference in the United Kingdom. Serguey Ivanov 
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This is because net migration is much larger in the United Kingdom while fertility 
is slightly lower than in France. Yet in both countries, fertility significantly above 
replacement would be needed to completely offset the loss of migrant inflow.  
 
Table 2: 
Working-age population in 2025 and 2050, index (2010=100), combinations of 
fertility variants and net migration (thousand per year) scenarios 
Fertility variant  Net 
migration   Low Constant  Medium High 
Germany 
2025 
0 89  89  89  89 
110 91  91  91  91 
1,060 102  102  102  102 
2050 
0 56  61  64  72 
110 63  69  71  80 
1,060 101  97  101  110 
Italy 
2025 
0 91  91  91  91 
150
a 96  96  96  96 
330 101  101  101  101 
2050 
0 56  62  64  72 
150
a 69  75  77  86 
330 93  100  102  112 
France 
2025 
0 97  97  97  97 
100 98  98  98  98 
2050 
0 79  90  89  99 
100 85  96  95  105 
United Kingdom 
2025 
0 97  97  97  97 
170
b 103  103  103  103 
2050 
0 77  87  87  97 
170
b 97  107  107  118 
Notes: 
a 220 in 2010-2015, 150 thereafter; 
b 188 in 2010-2015, 170-175 thereafter 
Source: United Nations DEMOBASE Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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Since the likelihood of zero migration and fertility declines to the levels 
currently observed in several European countries are rather modest in both 
countries, the natural reproduction of the labour force in France (with a moderate 
increase of immigration) and the United Kingdom (even provided that 
immigration somewhat declines) seems assured for decades to come.  
Lowest-low fertility will, however, shape dramatic declines of WAP in 
Germany during the entire projection period and in Italy after 2025. Before 2025, 
no future fertility change can affect WAP. Provided that immigration continues at 
the current levels, by 2025 WAP will decrease by 4 per cent in Italy and 9 per 
cent in Germany. In case immigration stops, WAP will decrease by an additional 
2 percentage points in Germany and by 4 percentage points in Italy.  
Given the ingrained culture of lowest-low fertility in both countries, it is 
appropriate to concentrate, for 2025-2050, on two fertility variants: constant and 
slowly ascending paths (United Nations medium variant). The contraction of 
WAP will intensify strikingly after 2025 in either variant in both these countries. 
If total fertility remains there at current levels of 1.3-1.4 (Table 1) and migration 
continues as assumed by the United Nations, then the negative gap in WAP with 
respect to the levels in 2010 will widen to as much as 25 per cent in Italy and to 
31 per cent in Germany. A gradual rise of the total fertility to 1.5-1.6 (United 
Nations medium variant) will make only a marginal difference of 2 percentage 
points, while ceasing migration will contract WAP by an additional 7 percentage 
points in Germany and by 13 percentage points in Italy.  
In order to balance these losses, immigration to Italy should more than double, 
while in Germany the inflow of migrants should be increased ten-fold. The 
negative impact of past fertility trends is so powerful that even a fast-track 
fertility increase—starting immediately and leading to the total fertility rate at 
replacement level in the last relevant period (Table 1)—will not prevent WAP 
from declining by 14 per cent in Italy and by 20 per cent in Germany. 
By replacement migration we understand the volume of net migration needed 
to offset labour shortages due to under-replacement of cohorts. The replacement 
migration paradigm is relevant for Germany and Italy, yet not so much for France 
and the United Kingdom. In the former country, just a modest increase of 
immigration will stabilise WAP, while in the latter even a slightly ‘smaller than 
now’ immigration would not lead to contraction.  
 
 
5  Participation in the labour market 
Not everyone of working age is able to work, wishes to enter the labour market, 
or actually has a job. Labour force participation (economic activity) and 
employment rates shape labour supply as much as demography does. Within the 
context of deteriorating demographics it is appropriate to focus on two issues: Serguey Ivanov 
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past trends of ‘participation’ indicators, current differentials and a potential for 
balancing the demographic decline. 
 
5.1  Dynamics of labour force: Demographic and economic 
components 
The aggregate levels of economic activity vary among countries, with the highest 
level claimed by the United Kingdom and the lowest by Italy (Figure 5). Until the 
early to mid-1980s, between 70 and 80 per cent of WAP in France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom participated in the labour force. Subsequently the trends 
diverged with gentle waves around the stable levels or slightly descending trends 
in Germany and the United Kingdom as opposed to a sharp decline in France. In 
Italy, for a long time the propensity for gainful employment has been as low as 
approximately 55 per cent, but from the late 1970s to around 1990 it gained 10 
percentage points; then the trend inflected again and by 2007 LFPR went down 
below the low level of the 1970s. As a result the current LFPR range widely, from 
50 per cent in Italy to 61 per cent in France to 75 per cent in the United Kingdom.  
The shifts in the age structure may have a significant impact on the aggregate 
LFPR. Ageing depresses LFPR (Table 3) because it shifts the WAP’s centre of 
gravity towards groups with lower participation rates. In 2000, the aggregate 
LFPR for WAP aged 15-64 varied from 62.5 per cent in Italy to 69.5 in France, to 
75.6 in Germany, to 76.3 in the United Kingdom. Since then, ageing depressed 
the aggregate LFPR in France by 1.1 percentage points and in the United 
Kingdom by half as much. In Germany and Italy, what contributed to the increase 
of LFPR was the transitory rejuvenation of the WAP (echo of the baby boom). In 
the coming decades, the impact of the age structure on LFPR will be universally 
negative and substantive. This effect continues. As demonstrated by Carone 
(2005), by 2025 the ageing of the labour force will have depressed the aggregate 
LFPR by 3 percentage points in France and by 2 percentage points in Italy and the 
United Kingdom. If fertility follows an ascending path as assumed in the medium 
variant of the United Nations population projections, the impact will reverse some 
time during 2025-2050. These demographic shifts are pre-programmed by 
fertility, but they can be altered by immigration, which always contains a 
disproportionately large selection of the most economically active age groups.  
The importance of demographic impacts on the aggregate level of economic 
activity notwithstanding, LFPR is driven essentially by economic factors. During 
the last four decades, increased economic activity in Germany and Italy was 
shaped by a contribution to labour force growth that was far larger than the 
contribution made by the growth of working-age population. In Italy, a 
strengthened aspiration for remunerative employment accounted for three-
quarters of the increase of labour force from 1984 to 2007 (Figure  4). An 
increased propensity to seek jobs contributed even more (87 per cent) to the 
growth of available labour in Germany. Moreover, a jump in the LFPR in the Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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early 2000s coincided with the beginning of the negative growth in the WAP: the 
former overcompensated for the latter and thus prevented proper 
acknowledgement of the force of demographics. In France and in the United 
Kingdom, the demographic base of the labour force grew significantly stronger, 
while the levels of LFPR had seen a much smaller change.  
 
Table 3: 
Change in total labour force participation rates (per cent) 
Total  Due to changes in 
age-specific LFPR Due to shifts in age structure 
Country 
2000-2007  2000-2007  2000-2007 2007-2025 2025-2050 
France 2.2  3.3  -1.1  -2.3  0.9 
Germany 4.0 3.4  0.7  -2.2  -0.2 
Italy 2.3  1.5  0.8  -3.5  0.8 
United Kingdom  -0.1  0.5  -0.6  -0.5  0.2 










































































Source: OECDStat, United Nations DEMOBASE 
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Neither the levels nor the trends of participation in the labour force are similar 
for different population groups. The clearest distinctions run along gender and age 
lines: everywhere the overwhelming majority of adult men are economically 
active, while fewer women seek gainful employment. Concurrently, the trends in 
aggregate LFPR are driven primarily by shifts in female labour. Among young 
people, work competes with education. Participation in the labour force declines 
around the statutory retirement age, although the push and pull factors shaping the 
economic activity of older persons vary. The trends of economic activity of these 
groups are not necessarily always oriented in the same direction; they have 
different demographic weights and, therefore, unequal inputs into the dynamics of 
the labour force. 
It is not clear whether there is any systematic reserve in the participation of 
men of prime working age in the labour force. In France, in Germany and in the 
United Kingdom, more than 90 per cent of men in the age bracket 25-55 years 
either work or actively seek work. Italy is different, in that 20 per cent of men in 
their late twenties do not seek gainful employment, but the distinctions in the 
other age groups are marginal. Although the variation across age groups is low, 
the rates are not identical: there is a noticeable (albeit small) decrease after peaks 
in the thirties, which intensifies in the early fifties with the resulting 3-5 
percentage point drop in the aggregate participation in the labour force 
(OECDStat). Combined with the demographic structural effect noted above, this 
is able to significantly depress the total LFPR for prime-age males.  
 
5.2  Economic activity of young persons 
The youngest age group (15-19) is ‘exposed to the risk’ of employment only to 
the extent that one’s graduation from a mandatory education level typically 
happens before age 20. The percentage employed (and, by extension, 
economically active) may be significantly affected by the actual average age of 
university enrolment and gainful employment during summer vacation; these 
phenomena are country-specific and bring disturbances to the estimation of 
LFPR. According to OECD estimates, the average for France and Italy dropped 
from 41 per cent in 1970 to 13 per cent in 2007 (data for Germany and the United 
Kingdom are missing). In several developed countries, this proportion currently 
exceeds 50 per cent, which apparently implies that a large proportion of youth 
enters the labour market right after graduation from high school.  
The first ‘fully exposed’ group includes youth aged 20-24, for which the 
general trend is towards increasing full-time enrolment in tertiary education at the 
expense of seeking full-time jobs on the labour market (Figure 5). This trend has 
intensified since the 1980s. In spite of significant inter-country differentials in 
levels and trends of youth involvement in the labour force, any sustained reversals 
are unlikely even when labour supply becomes significantly strained.  

































































Note: In France, a break in series in 2005 happened because the source of data changed from one annual survey 




5.3  Economic activity of older persons 
The economic activity of older persons depends on a complicated array of factors. 
Most generally, much fewer older persons than persons of prime working age 
participate in the labour force. For instance, LFPRs in the age group 55-64 are at 
least twice lower than in the age group 25-54. How often men and women seek 
employment past their prime working age is determined by the statutory 
retirement age, pension-wage ratios, availability of re-training, part-time jobs, 
adaptive work environments etc. A cardinal, but difficult to measure, factor is the 
culture-specific relative value of leisure vs. income.  
For men, the most common statutory age of pension entitlement is 65, for 
women 60; in some professions retirement at the statutory age is mandatory. The 
average effective retirement age is typically lower for women (Table 4). The gap 
is particularly wide for men in Italy and for women in Germany. This implies that 
many people take advantage of a multitude of arrangements that allow taking 
early retirement with full pension entitlements. In many countries, large groups of 
older workers are opting for early retirement (Gruber and Wise 2002). The 
proliferation of such arrangements, coupled with an increased value of leisure and 
increased life-long savings has led to an effective lowering of the retirement age Serguey Ivanov 
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over the last 30 years. This is associated with decreasing LFPR in the age group 
55-64 (Figure 6). The trend has meanwhile halted and even started to reverse, in 
response to a rising length of one’s healthy life, coupled with stronger financial 
incentives for older people to work. The Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe has shown that better health may account for as much as 10 
percentage points higher participation rates for men and women aged 50-64 
(Kalwij and Vermeulen 2005).  
In order to keep the pension systems solvent and to effectively capitalise on 
the increased expectancy of healthy life, governments are adopting plans that aim 
to increase the statutory retirement age in small increments and to close the 
gender gaps. Thus, in the United Kingdom the retirement age will rise from 65 
years for men and 60 years for women to 68 years for all; the process will start in 
2024 for men and in 2010 for women. In Germany, the statutory retirement age 
for men and women is 65 years; it will increase by two years during 2012-2029. 
In Italy, the reform is short-termed and concerns women only, whose retirement 
age will increase, between 2009 and 2013, from 59 to 61 years, while no decision 
was taken regarding the retirement age for men (currently 65 years).  
 
Table 4: 
Average effective age at retirement and the statutory retirement age, 2002-2007 
Men Women 
Country  Average 
effective  Statutory  Average 
effective  Statutory 
France  58.7 60.0 59.5 60.0 
Germany  62.1 65.0 61.0 65.0 
Italy  60.8 65.0 60.8 60.0 
United  Kingdom  63.2 65.0 61.9 60.0 
Note: The average effective age of retirement is derived from observed changes in participation rates over a 
5-year period for successive cohorts of workers (by 5-year age groups) aged 40 and over. 
Source: OECD estimates derived from the European and national labour force surveys. 
 
 
While in Germany and the United Kingdom, raising the age at retirement 
conforms with the actual trends towards remaining economically active for a 
longer period (in the United Kingdom the participation rate of older persons 
jumped by 10 percentage points in 10 years), in France and Italy—where the 
national cultures value leisure time more—the opposite trend towards earlier 
retirement prevails.  
In Germany, the start of the contraction of the working-age population 
coincided with a recent steep increase of older persons’ participation in the labour 
force. It is rather speculative to deduce the latter trend from the former trend since 
the period is so short. In the long run, however, such a relationship is likely to 
appear.  Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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Postponing retirement (made possible by better health, and made necessary by 
the contraction of the WAP) constitutes a major reserve and a primary mechanism 
for society to adapt to sub-replacement fertility. Rising the statutory retirement 
age may have a strong impact on WAP dynamics because even a moderate 
increase in LFPR at the higher end of the age distribution will be magnified by the 
swelling size of the respective age groups. 
 
Figure 6: 




























































Note: In Germany, a break in series in 2005 happened because the source of data changed from an annual survey 




These trends may be arrested by a growing attraction of leisurely lifestyles, 
supported by considerable pensions and life-long savings. The interplay of these 
forces promises to be complicated and long-lasting. This explains, at least 
partially, a 20-25 percentage point difference between labour participation rates of 
older persons in ‘work-oriented’ Germany and the United Kingdom on the one 
side, and ‘leisure-oriented’ France and Italy on the other (Figure 6). The opposite 
trends in France and Germany may stem from differences in the evolution of the 
labour markets.  
 
5.4  Economic activity of women  
Participation in the labour force is increasingly becoming the norm for women of 
all ages. This increase (Figure 7) has outweighed the reductions of economic Serguey Ivanov 
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activity of men and youth of both sexes. In the United Kingdom, the majority of 
working-age women had already belonged to the labour force as early as the 
1970s, and by 2007 their labour force participation rate had attained 70 per cent. 
France, Germany and Italy underwent a genuine revolution in women’s 
employment. From 1970, economic activity rates of working-age women 
increased in France by 17 percentage points, in Italy by 22 points and in Germany 
by 23 points. As a result, currently 65-70 per cent of women are part of the labour 
force in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Italy’s rate is still only 50 per 
cent, however. The gender gaps have narrowed everywhere, yet they are far from 
closing: the male-female differential of economic activity rates ranges from 9 
percentage points in France to 24 in Italy. The Lisbon Strategy of the European 
Union admitted that a shortage of economically active women is a major 
weakness of the European labour market. Given that women constitute half of 
WAP, closing gender gaps (particularly in Italy) could narrow the deficits in the 
labour force caused by demographic factors, but in the long-term perspective 
could not eliminate them.  
 
Figure 7: 































































Burniaux et al. (2003) looked at the potential of policies to balance the 
demographic impacts from the perspective of the aggregate LFPR, rather than that 
of the overall labour supply. They conclude that the combined effect of possible Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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reforms targeting prime-age women, older workers and youth might suffice to 
stabilise LFPR until 2025 but will be insufficient to offset the additional reduction 
of participation likely to be caused by demographic changes beyond 2025. This is 
in line with our findings. Several studies have demonstrated, from a more 
sophisticated cohort perspective, that rising female participation rates may 
significantly, but not completely, offset the decline of WAP (Burniaux et al. 2003; 
Kok et al. 2003; Carone et al. 2005a). 
 
5.5 Unemployment 
It is the available workers that constitute the labour force. The extent of its actual 
use is determined by employment opportunities. During the after-war “glorious 
three decades”, until the early 1970s, unemployment was typically below 3 per 
cent of the labour force. Since then, unemployment has risen tremendously in all 
four countries and the range of fluctuation increased to 6-10 per cent of civilian 
labour force (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: 





































It is not our goal here to dwell on the complex factors of unemployment. 
What we seek to reiterate is that high unemployment constitutes a capacious 
reservoir for replacing the labour force lost to demographic forces. Even in the 
United Kingdom, during spurts of burgeoning economic growth, unemployment Serguey Ivanov 
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was much higher than half a century ago; it has also been higher than the level 
that is deemed normal as a lubricator of economic change and a correlate of 
beneficial labour mobility. Some analyses conclude that in the European Union 
employment started increasing faster than WAP (Carone et al. 2005a), but it is 
unclear whether this is a reversal of the long-term trend or a cyclical 
phenomenon. One argument in favour of the systematic decrease of 
unemployment would be the contraction of the share in the labour force of youth 
(who typically suffer most from unemployment). Conversely, adding more 
persons aged 50 or older to the labour force—which certainly will be happening 
at least during our first projection period—may increase the aggregate 
unemployment rate, due to the fact that they are also disproportionately exposed 
to the risk of unemployment.  
Sometimes the employment rate is defined as the proportion of employed 
persons in the WAP, rather than in the labour force (e.g. Feld 2006). In fact, the 
objectives to increase employment set by the Lisbon Strategy of the European 
Community are framed in this fashion. Such goal-setting appears easier to 
articulate, probably because more volatile ER trends are smoothed by more 
predictable LF trends. However, combining these fundamentally different 
phenomena may blur policy options, especially in the long term, and are 
definitely inappropriate to the goals of this paper.  
 
5.6 Cohort  effects 
The continuation of the current rates of entry into, and exit from, the labour force 
of consecutive cohorts would produce significant impacts on the projected LFPR 
of certain age-sex groups, for women in particular (Carone 2005). Retaining this 
central assumption produces the cohort effects that would offset the demographic 
structural effects and expand the aggregate, especially in the first projection 
period (Table  5). The positive impact of cohort effects on period LFPR is 
expected to be particularly large in Germany and Italy, i.e. in the countries with 
highest declines of WAP.  
 
Table 5: 
Labour force participation rates in 2025 and 2050 
Constant-participation 
scenario 
Constant entry-exit rates 
scenario  Country 2007 
2025 2050 2025 2050 
France 69.2  66.2  66.7  71.7  73.1 
Germany 71.3  71.1  71.5  78.7  79.0 
Italy 61.6  59.4  60.7  68.1  70.2 
United Kingdom  76.3  74.2  74.2  77.8  78.3 
Source: OECDStat and Carone 2005 
 Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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5.7  Employed labour force 
Table 6 presents simulated relative changes, from 2010 to 2025 and 2050, of the 
number of employed in the national economy under one fertility assumption 
(medium level of United Nations projections), two variants of net migration (at 
constant levels assumed in the United Nations projections and without migration) 
and two employment scenarios that combine assumptions with respect to LFPR 
and ER. Scenario A uses the LFPRs from Carone (2005) which were obtained via 
a continuation into the future of the current rates of entry into and exit from of 
one-year cohorts. Employment rates are assumed to remain at their 2007 levels. 
Scenario B adds full employment.  
The simulation results present a wide spectrum of futures. In all countries, 
high unemployment means significant reserves for balancing the adverse 
demographic situation.  
The sustainment of the (recently intensified) entry into labour force of 
women, coupled with a stronger retention of older workers would more than 
offset—at the usual (2007) levels of unemployment—the decreases of working-
age populations for the next 15 years in all four countries. Even without 
immigration the size of the employed population will either not change or will 
decrease only marginally. In addition, keeping immigration at the current levels 
will increase the labour supply, except in Germany. During that period, the 
dynamics of the employed population will be comparable with the trends in WAP 
in 1990-2005 when the issue of a contracting labour force was of minor concern.  
Yet the age schedule in the working life of women may shift as a result of 
changing childbearing patterns. Hence, the assumption of continuity of entry-exit 
rates may not be entirely compatible with the assumption of a significant fertility 
increase in the currently lowest-low fertility countries (Germany and Italy). It is 
the latter assumption that served as the basis for the projections presented in this 
paper. In particular, a decrease of childlessness would be likely to lead to major 
changes in the entry-exit schedules. It is difficult to foresee, however, the extent 
and even the direction of change in every particular country because childbearing 
behaviour and childrearing-related patterns of employment depend on a myriad of 
cultural, institutional and social factors. Yet the stability of the labour supply 
under assumption used for scenario A may be fragile one.  
Later on, the role of this factor will decline. Attaining full employment would 
significantly increase the labour supply. The trends in employed population in all 
four countries will be firmly ascendant, even without new immigration, and the 
increments of the labour force in Italy and the United Kingdom will be 
comparable with those during 1984-2007 (Figure  4). Moreover, complete 
eradication of unemployment by 2025 could increase the employment index by 
several points, which, ceteris paribus, will be sufficient to plug labour deficits in 
all countries save Germany.  




Labour supply in 2025 and 2050 under WAP, LFPR and ER hypotheses (employed 
labour force, index 2010=100) 
2025     2050 
Employment scenarios    Employment scenarios  Country 
A B      A  B 
  Net migration according to United Nations projections 
France  102 122  100 118 
United  Kingdom 105 112  110 117 
Italy  106 130  88 104 
Germany 100  106 79  83 
 Zero  migration 
France  100 120  94 110 
United Kingdom 99  106  89  95 
Italy 101  123  73  86 
Germany 98  103  71  74 
Sources: United Nations DEMOBASE, OECDStat and LABORSTA (ILO) 
 
 
In the following quarter-century the dynamics of labour supply in scenario A 
sharply diverge. The robust demography of France will secure the stability of that 
country’s labour supply despite a modest level of immigration. Yet immigration 
would make the difference between stability and decline. In the United Kingdom 
the labour supply will increase by 5 index points under sustained immigration. If, 
however, immigration halted the employed population would dwindle to 89 per 
cent of its 2010 size. A stop in immigration would not even be entirely 
compensated by full employment.  
The prospects of labour supply in the second quarter of the century will be 
more challenging for Italy and Germany. These countries have in common much 
larger negative impacts of protracted very low fertility, especially after 2025. 
Provided stable employment characteristics and continuous immigration, by 2050 
the employed population will decrease by 12 per cent in Italy and by 21 per cent 
in Germany; in the absence of immigration, the decrease will attain 27 and 29 per 
cent, respectively. The eradication of unemployment will make a difference but 
would be largely insufficient to close the demographic gap.  
In both countries the role of immigration in replenishing the labour force will 
increase from a modest one in 2010-2025 to a very substantial one by 2050, and 
in particular in Italy, where it will contribute from 15 to 18 index points to the 
dynamics of the employed population. Germany is likely to remain hostage to its 
demographics because the current level of immigration is by far insufficient to 
sustain (even in combination with full employment) the size of the employed 
population. Foreign labour also matters elsewhere because in the selected 
scenarios, immigration (at the volumes assumed by the United Nations) typically 
makes the difference between growth and decline of working populations.  Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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The results of our simulations are consistent with other analyses, yet they 
bring some additional insights on the role of the dynamics of the labour force, 
provided that the employment histories of cohorts remain unchanged under 
contrasting assumptions about international migration. Since the cohort-
component method was applied by Carone (2005) with higher-than-in-the-past 
entry-exit coefficients, it necessarily leads to increasing LFPR, as cohorts are 
projected into the future. The method is convincing with respect to the feasibility 
of significant rises of the overall level of participation in the labour force.  
The institutions of the European Union acknowledge that even if the Lisbon 
employment targets are met, overall employment levels will fall due to 
demographic change (European Commission 2005). This forecast is plausible on 
the EU average level and fully applies to Germany and Italy. The labour markets 
of France and the United Kingdom will benefit, however, from their better 
demographic dynamics. This underscores the utility of the country-specific 
approach when the strength of factors varies widely, and particularly so in 
demographic dynamics which are likely to become the most important 
determinants of the reproduction of the employed labour force.  
 
 
6  Utilisation of labour 
Those who have a job work different hours, have vacations of unequal length, 
enjoy a varying number of holidays and take uneven medical leaves. In the end, 
what matters most is the total pool of work hours available in the national 
economy.  
 
6.1  Levels and trends 
Labour utilisation (LU) varies across countries and changes over time (Figure 9). 
The general trend was a decline over a long period of time, but the monotony and 
speed of decline did vary. The largest decrease occurred in France where LU 
dropped by 22 per cent from 2011 hours in 1970 to 1561 hours in 2007, while the 
lowest occurred in Italy: from 1859 in 1980 to 1824 in 2007. The LU levels have 
diverged very significantly: the gap between the highest and the lowest levels 
soared from 3 per cent in 1970 to 27 per cent in 2007. In Germany, the decrease 
of LU since 1990 has more than offset the increase in aggregate employment.  
















































6.2 Working  time 
The major factors of variation of LU are the length of the work week (measured 
in hours) and the length of paid vacation and paid holidays (measured in either 
calendar days or workday equivalents). Working time is subject to limitations by 
national law. The 2000 amendment to the Working Time Directive of the 
European Union of 1993 limits the maximum length of a working week to 48 
hours in 7 days and a minimum rest period of 11 hours in each 24 hours. 
Legislations of many Member States provide for lower ceilings. In 2002, France 
had limited the statutory working week to 35, although subsequently the 
regulations have been relaxed. In contrast, in the United Kingdom it is possible 
for several industries or professions to ‘opt out’ of the 48 hour working week. 
Typically, national legislations allow exceptions for certain professions or 
occupations. Everywhere quite a few employees or self-employed work longer 
hours than the generally permitted maximum. Even in France 24 per cent of the 
employed aged 25 and more have actually worked more than 40 hours per week 
in 2007; in the United Kingdom this share was as high as 55 per cent; among 
them 24 per cent have worked more than 50 hours per week. On the other hand, 
many people prefer or are compelled to opt for either half-day employment or 
other contractual arrangements that result in shortened work weeks. The trends of 
the average hours worked (Figure  10) are driven by the shifts in these Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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distributions. The average work week in the United Kingdom is 3.2 hours longer 
than in France (Figure 10), which translates into more than 150 hours difference 
in LU. During the last decade the actual work week was relatively stable in 
Germany and Italy, while decreasing significantly in Britain. In France the 
introduction of the 35-hour limit depressed the average work week below 38 by 













































There are other factors as well that determine the levels and drive the trends of 
LU. They include paid leave, national holidays, medical leave and time lost to 
labour disputes. Data on all these components are scarce, but paid vacations are 
perhaps the major factor in the variation of LU.  
 
6.3 Paid  leave 
Most countries around the world have labour laws mandating employers to give 
to a worker a certain number of paid days off every year. Paid holidays are also 
regulated by law. There has been a long decreasing trend in the number of public 
holidays from several dozen in the Middle Ages to just a few by the beginning of 
the 20th century. Since then the trend has reversed again. In some countries, Serguey Ivanov 
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besides national holidays there are public holidays observed in subnational 
jurisdictions.  
Considerable variations exist in the length of paid annual leave and paid 
public holidays across the developed states. The mandatory vacation time in the 
European Union is four weeks. The four countries under review are split into two 
groups: in France, Germany and Italy the entitlement varies from 31 to 34 
working days, while in the United Kingdom it is one-third lower (20 days). Since 
L U  i s  s o  m u c h  h i g h e r  i n  I t a l y  t h a n  in the other countries and the average 
workweek is about the same, many workers apparently take much shorter 
vacations—that is, unless strikes, sick leave and maternity leave account for the 
difference. The number of paid holidays varies, in the four countries, from eight 
in England (United Kingdom) to 13 in Saxony (Germany). 
Similarly to the impact of the demographic structure on the labour force 
(Table 3), the age composition of the employed population influences LU: labour 
utilisation tends to be higher in younger populations. Boulhol (2009) has 
explicitly demonstrated that differences in population structure by age contribute 
importantly to the variations in LU. 
 
6.4  Total time worked 
Table 7 presents the simulation of total time worked (TT) through the application 
of labour utilisation (LU) assumptions to the combinations of employment and 
migration hypotheses discussed above. Both LU scenarios assume growth of LU 
(except in Italy in Scenario A) while the continuation of the current levels into the 
future is implicitly reflected in the scenarios of labour supply presented above. 
These LU scenarios represent a band of ‘best practices’. Best-practice 
benchmarks make more sense than arbitrarily chosen values because they are the 
levels that have been actually recorded in the group of countries whose labour 
supply is simulated in this paper. This approach is also in line with the Open 
Method of Coordination for Social Policy adopted by the European Union 
(Pestieau 2006).  
Variant I assumes that LU in Italy remains at 1825 hours per year (as 
observed in 2007), while meeting this level implies a growth of 9 per cent in the 
United Kingdom, 17 per cent France and 27 per cent in Germany. Even this 
relatively low option would call for profound changes on the labour market of 
France and the United Kingdom, yet such changes will be less needed there. 
Germany—due to the adverse demographics and the lack of potential in 
increasing labour participation—will find itself in the most challenging position. 
In France and in the United Kingdom the raising of LU to the current Italian 
standard would ensure robust increases of labour supply even if unemployment 
remains high (Scenario A), provided that the recent increases in participation rates 
do not reverse and immigration is maintained. Combined with full employment 
(Scenario B), such an increase in hours worked would raise the labour supply by Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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more than one-quarter in both countries throughout the entire projection period. 
Moreover, the intensified utilisation of labour in such magnitudes could largely 
offset the demographic effects, even if immigration were to cease.  
 
Table 7: 
Labour supply in 2025 and 2050 under migration, employment and labour utilisation 
hypotheses (total time worked, index 2010=100) 
2025     2050 
Employment scenarios    Employment scenarios  Country 
A B    A  B 
LU = 1825 hours per worker per year (Italy, 2007) 
Net migration assumed in the United Nations projections 
France 119  129  117  127 
United Kingdom  115  126  120  132 
Italy 106  113  88  94 
Germany 128  135  101  106 
Zero migration 
France 117  127  110  119 
United Kingdom  108  118  97  107 
Italy 101  107  73  78 
Germany 125  132  90 95 
LU=2011 hours per worker per year (France 1970) 
Net migration assumed in the United Nations projections 
France 132  143  129  140 
United Kingdom  126  138  132  145 
Italy 117  125  97  103 
Germany 141  149  111  117 
Zero migration 
France 129  141  120  131 
United Kingdom  119  131  108  118 
Italy 111  118  81  86 
Germany 137  145  99  104 
Note: Employment hypotheses are the same as in Table 6 
Sources: DEMOBASE; OECDStat; EUROSTAT; LABORSTA 
 
Assuming that LU in Germany rises to the Italian level and immigration does 
continue, during 2010-2025 that country’s labour supply will be ensured, as well 
as in France or the United Kingdom, with or without immigration. During the 
following 25 years immigration will make all difference between stability and a 
precipitous decline. With immigration, the labour supply in 2050 will be 1-6 per 
cent larger than in 2010, while without immigration it would dwindle by 10 per 
cent. Even full employment would leave a 5 per cent gap.  Serguey Ivanov 
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In Italy retaining the current relatively high level of labour utilisation would 
not prevent the labour supply from decreasing significantly (by some 12 per cent) 
by the middle of the century even if immigration is sustained and unless 
unemployment is substantially diminished. Halting immigration would be 
followed by a 27 per cent drop of labour supply; in this case even a complete 
eradication of unemployment could not prevent the labour supply from 
contracting by 14 per cent from its 2010 level.  
Variant II is based on a higher benchmark of 2011 hours per year recorded in 
France in 1970. This assumption implies a 10 per cent increase in Italy, 20 per 
cent in the United Kingdom, 29 per cent in France and 40 per cent in Germany. 
Attaining it and retaining immigration would have closed all gaps created by 
adverse demographics in all four countries, except for in Italy in the 
‘unemployment-as-usual’ scenario. In the zero-migration scenario the gap in Italy 
would reach 14-19 percentage points.  
Some concluding observations can be made. The differentials in fertility that 
may seem trivial on the scale of a secular demographic transition determine a 
wide diversity of labour force trajectories. The half-a-child difference in fertility 
rates results in strikingly different dynamics for the working-age population. For 
France and the for UK, the decline in fertility has been sufficiently weak so as to 
sustain the 2010 workforce well into the future, even if at current low levels of 
immigration and without any changes to participation, employment or hours 
worked. 
By contrast, the labour force is bound to shrink rapidly in lowest-low fertility 
Germany and Italy unless it is offset by either immigration sustained at 
unrealistically high levels or by drastic changes in the features of the labour 
market. Assuming that fertility will follow medium (slowly ascendant) paths, by 
the mid-century WAP in Italy and Germany will fall by 25-39 per cent. Moreover, 
the existing age structures in both countries make it impossible to stabilise WAP, 
even if fertility were to start increasing more rapidly (high variant). The negative 
impacts of medium-low fertility in France and the United Kingdom are several 
times weaker. 
The observed (and then the extrapolated into the future) entries into and exits 
from the labour force (Carone 2005) yield LFPRs (Table 5) that are sufficient to 
offset small demographically-induced dents in the labour force in medium-low 
fertility countries like France and the United Kingdom, yet they are not sufficient 
to offset the large-scale contraction of the working-age population in the lowest-
low fertility countries Italy and Germany. Immigration and eradication of 
unemployment could close the gap during 2010-2015, though not in the following 
quarter-century when Italy would need to increase the hours worked per worker 
by about 10 per cent and Germany by more than one-quarter. The simulations 
suggest that immigration is likely to increase and acquire new functions as a 
compensatory mechanism for population decline and as the alternative to 
adjustments through more intensive utilisation of labour.  Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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7  Policy options 
Public policies are able to affect all components and factors of the labour supply 
that have been reviewed above. The adverse demographic impacts can be 
alleviated by labour market reforms or, alternatively, by increased immigration. 
However, this is not the case everywhere.  
In these hard economic times, all four countries reviewed here are tightening 
immigration rules in order to ‘protect’ the labour market. How soon these policies 
will reverse is pure guesswork: the resumption of economic growth may not 
suffice because certain attitudes tend to take root. Yet, they are most likely to 
reverse themselves in the future, a change driven by demographically induced 
labour deficits that cannot be alleviated by economic adjustments alone. This is a 
long-term process, but one which could be accelerated given the necessary 
constellation of intervening factors. 
 
7.1 Immigration 
International migration already makes a huge difference in the reproduction of the 
labour force. Closing demographic deficits with increased numbers of migrants is 
realistic when the deficits are moderate, as in France and the United Kingdom. 
But wherever lasting low fertility rates create very large shortages of WAP—such 
as in Germany and Italy—balancing them with commensurate immigration is 
clearly unrealistic. For instance, for Germany this would entail having to allow in, 
absorb and integrate more than one million migrants per year. This would be 
almost ten  times larger than the current stream and on a par with legal 
immigration in the United States (whose population is almost 4 times larger). 
Börsch-Supan (1998) came to a comparable conclusion: that Germany requires 
annual net migration of 800,000, and over several decades, to stabilise the pay-as-
you-go pension system. Massive arrivals in the early 1990s have attained this 
magnitude, but only for few years; it is much more difficult to conceive sustaining 
such immigration year after year and decade after decade.  
Governments protect native labour force from competition and their national 
culture from erosion. They are mindful of many problems associated with 
immigration and therefore reluctant to ‘throw the doors wide open’. Yet, 
immigration is an established and large-scale phenomenon. Streams of economic 
migration do enter the four countries from varied directions as supply of labour 
does not satisfy demand in different economic sectors and professions. 
Unsatisfied demand may arise on the lower levels of the professional ladder 
where natives are reluctant to take certain low-pay or ‘degrading’ jobs or where 
technical skills are in short supply. Governments have experimented with 
different regulatory mechanisms aimed at resolving short-term problems with 
short-term solutions. Some interventions proved successful, while others created 
more problems than they solved. In most countries, official positions on Serguey Ivanov 
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international migration, goal-setting and implementation have evolved into 
exceedingly complex, incoherent and sometimes contradictory policies, which, in 
addition, do not take into account unintended consequences of actions. Even when 
particular elements are sensible and effective, the entire mechanism often fails.  
Current economic problems do differ from long-term demographic declines 
and such declines will not happen everywhere. Most likely, France and the United 
Kingdom will be spared the contraction of WAP, while Germany and Italy are 
going to see it on a large scale. Coping with large-scale and prolonged contraction 
of the labour force is a new challenge. The institutions of the European Union 
have embarked on a new path that envisages more sustained immigration flows 
required to meet the needs of the EU labour market (European Commission 
2005). While increased immigration may significantly attenuate labour shortages, 
eventual massive streams of migrants will exacerbate the pressure on social 
security nets. Cultural environments need serious restructuring because their 
current abilities to absorb and integrate migrants are inappropriate even for actual 
stocks of migrants (European Commission 2005a). Otherwise, large increases of 
immigration may swell the numbers of the unemployed and socially excluded. 
The necessity to increase immigration requires rethinking the entire paradigm of 
what is good and what is bad for the nation, as well as what should be the trade-
off between preserving the national identity and developing multiculturalism. 
The European Union is building a Union-wide space for free movement of 
workers. This is inherently good for a number of reasons, especially from the 
perspective of individuals. But from the macroeconomic supply-demand 
perspective of labour, facilitating the redistribution of labour within the Union is 
controversial. The economic differentials between the newly ascended Member 
States and the EU-15 create strong push-pull factors. Unlike in the 
demographically expanding past, mass migration under the new demographic 
regime leaves little place for win-win outcomes. Since in the demographic sense 
there are no labour-surplus countries in Europe—only different degrees of 
shortage—East-West migrations within Europe Without Borders will result in 
zero-sum results, spelling additional hardships for the less developed economies 
of sending countries. Since all these countries (except Poland) are small, draining 
them of labour force would make big dents in their labour markets without 
considerably attenuating the labour shortages in the receiving countries.  
Currently, the trend is towards restricting the access of non-Union nationals to 
the EU countries and to labour markets. Immigration criteria are tightening and 
the application of the European rules against illegal migrants is emphasised. The 
future may be cardinally different when opening the European Union to migrants 
from outside will become necessary to compensate for future WAP deficits.  
Migration from the low-fertility European countries to the east of the Union 
may be advantageous for the receiving countries, because of cultural proximity 
and better prospects for integration in the host societies. But the demographic 
consequences for the sending countries may be as negative as for the new Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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members of the Union. Since all of them, and especially the largest, Russia and 
Ukraine, are demographically as weak as are the weakest populations of the 
Union, large and lasting emigration flows will be akin to a zero-sum game with 
the senders being the losers.  
While human resources in Europe are limited and will become increasingly 
scarce, they are plentiful in the South. In terms of demographic potential, WAP 
increments in Turkey alone over the period 2010-2050 would be sufficient to 
compensate for one quarter of the WAP decrease in all of EU-25. 
 
7.2  Adjustments of the labour market 
Increasing participation in the labour market and the reigning in of unemployment 
constitute effective, attractive and possibly the most feasible options in reversing 
the decrease of labour supply. If recent increases of the participation of women 
and people past prime working age underwent a reversal, and unemployment 
remained as high as it is now, then the only means to prevent steep declines of 
available labour would consist of increasing immigration tremendously and, in 
fact, unrealistically.  
Increasing the utilisation of labour is also an option but, for many reasons, is 
difficult to implement. The arithmetic of the issue highlights that France and the 
United Kingdom do not have much of a need to resort to such an approach. By 
contrast, Germany and Italy would need it even if efforts to increase employment 
were successful. 
A diminishing supply of labour will press employers to embrace new policies 
with respect to persons past prime age, as well as to attract more female labour. 
Overall, development strategies already contain elements of the new vision as 
well as concrete recommendations aimed at necessary changes on the labour 
market. For instance, the core goals of the Luxembourg process aimed at adapting 
labour market policies in the European Union to the new technological and 
economic environments do conform to the actions arising from the need to adjust 
to the shrinking labour force. 
Labour force participation and employment rates react to public policies 
through varied channels. For instance, excessively stringent employment 
protection legislation tends to reduce the dynamism of the labour market, 
worsening employment prospects for women, the young and the elderly 
(European Commission 2006).  
Economic activity of men of prime working age is universally high, changes 
little over time, and has very limited growth potential. On the other hand, female 
participation in the labour force has increased ever since World War II; it varies 
across countries but is still much lower than the participation of men everywhere. 
The economic activity of women is elastic and responsive to a plethora of factors, 
including those that are amenable to direct government intervention, such as 
actions aimed at reducing the discrimination in the area of career development or Serguey Ivanov 
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at improving the compatibility of work and child care. Concrete incentives for 
women to work, recommended by the OECD for Germany, include reducing 
fiscal impediments to full-time female labour force participation by lowering the 
tax burden for second-earners and by introducing a health insurance charge for 
non-working spouses (OECD 2009a). 
Levels of economic activity vary at both tails of the age distribution. The 
participation of youth in the labour force is primarily the function of enrolment in 
post-secondary education, though it also depends on the availability of part-time 
jobs and the presence of relevant regulations; all factors which are amenable to 
public intervention.  
The participation of persons past prime working age depends on a host of 
factors where the retirement requirements and the conditions are pivotal. Most 
European countries have passed legislation to gradually increase the statutory 
retirement age. The rationale consists of supporting the solvency of pension 
funds. This indicates that serious changes can be initiated to avoid problems that 
would occur beyond the lifespan of all those currently alive. Labour shortages 
may even strengthen the case for more increases.  
Currently, the market is not particularly friendly towards the aged. This 
should change and is already changing, albeit slowly. Recent increases of LFPR 
of the relevant age groups constitute, most probably, the response to these 
changes. Looming deficits of younger labour are likely to motivate the employers 
to discontinue widespread practices of discrimination on the grounds of age and 
increase the abilities of their enterprises to absorb a more aged labour force. 
Public policies may greatly enhance the employability of older persons, promote 
flexible retirement and develop adaptive work environments.  
Increasing the statutory retirement age should be complemented by other 
more subtle and complex measures aimed at improving the abilities of persons 
attempting a career change. Appropriate public polices in this domain will be in 
line with the international instruments on ageing that were developed with 
concern for the issue of ageing rather than labour deficits. There appears to be a 
need for new incentives that would encourage workers to defer full retirement and 
continue to work, whether part-time or full-time. If such policies complied with 
the needs and limitations of persons past prime working age they could strengthen 
their propensity to remain economically active.  
On the other hand, those who want to be employed and actually do get a job 
work varied hours. Total annual time worked per worker in Italy is 27 per cent 
longer than in Germany. The distributions of workers by hours worked vary, 
which implies different incentives and opportunities for working part-time or 
overtime, as well as different amounts of time off. The mainstream trend was 
towards shorter working time: this trend has recently flattened but did not reverse. 
Legislative regulations to curtail any of the components that determine the overall 
time worked would presume serious shifts in public attitudes. However, a similar 
change with respect to retirement age may indicate that reversals, even on such Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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sensitive issues, may occur, provided that the public is persuaded, that 
compensation is attractive and that the resulting change is gradual. Concurrently, 
easing the restrictive and rigid labour regulations may bring serious positive 
effects. Causa (2008) has demonstrated that in the OECD countries stringent 
employment protection of workers on regular contracts has negative impacts on 
hours worked by men, over and beyond its restraining impact on employment 
levels.  
Adjustment policies may be facilitated or impeded by the nature of labour 
shortage; they may become closely interrelated through synergistic or blocking 
effects. For instance, labour shortages tend to increase the economic activity 
through higher wages. Concurrently, scarce labour supply is likely to strengthen 
the bargaining position of workers, in particular with respect to regulation of 
working time. Thus, systemic labour deficits are bound to obstruct efforts to 
realign the work regulations. Opening the door to immigration and relieving 
labour code rigidities are likely to act in the opposite direction.  
Economic output is not determined by the volume of labour alone. Growth in 
GDP per capita can be decomposed into the growth of the volume of labour and 
labour productivity. The latter may be raised by substituting labour for capital 
through technological progress and by investments in labour through education 
and training. In principle, the potential of labour productivity growth as an 
offsetting mechanism for population decline is large. All other parameters held 
constant, the projected decrease of WAP in Italy and Germany from 2010 to 2050 
(medium variant, with migration according to the United Nations assumptions) 
could be offset by annual labour productivity growth in the order of 0.6 per cent 
in Italy and 0.8 per cent in Germany. However, the social and economic costs of 
such balancing would be high. The average annual rates of labour productivity 
growth during 1970-2005 were 2.5 per cent in Italy and 2.7 per cent in Germany 
(Bassanini and Venn 2008). If these rates were sustained, 24 per cent of 
productivity growth in Italy and 30 per cent in Germany would be ‘earmarked’ to 
offset adverse demographic trends rather than contribute to improving living 
standards. 
 
7.3  Changes of reproductive behaviour 
Sub-replacement fertility levels in France and the United Kingdom are 
sufficiently high to ensure that future reduction of working-age population will be 
mild or nil. Lowest-low fertility in Germany and Italy, however, predetermines a 
contraction of the working-age population of such magnitude that mighty and 
bold efforts will be needed to prevent serious economic consequences. The good 
news is that these countries possess large adjustment potentials in different 
domains. In Italy, the participation in the labour force (and particularly that of 
women, though also of young men) may be seriously increased. In Germany the 
working time may be significantly lengthened. Both countries have accumulated Serguey Ivanov 
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experience in absorbing many migrants. However, country-specific best potentials 
would not necessarily be sufficient to close the demographic gaps. These gaps are 
very likely to become so wide as to require simultaneous transformations in many 
domains. With respect to many aspects of labour, social relations and lifestyles 
the demographic trends may push to a growing divergence between France and 
the United Kingdom on the one side and Germany and Italy on the other. This, in 
turn, may have implications for integrative processes in the EU space. 
The debate on the feasibility of public interventions aimed at reproductive 
behaviour in the developed countries focuses on the ways and means to secure the 
transition from lowest-low to medium-high fertility. This debate typically refrains 
from discussing above-replacement fertility because its achievement is presumed 
to be unrealistic—which implies that the total fertility rates above 2.2 by the end 
of the projection period underlying the high variant of United Nations projections 
are beyond the expectations even of the optimistic participants in these debates. It 
follows that a rapid increase of fertility soon in the projection period in a 
magnitude sufficient to yield, by 2050, a significantly larger WAP than in the 
high-fertility variant should be construed as definitively unlikely. The medium 
variant of the United Nations projections is based on the assumption of gradual 
fertility increase in the countries with lowest-low fertility, including Germany and 
Italy. Although neither the mechanism nor the determinants of such increase are 
explicitly defined in the projection hypotheses, the realisation of the medium 
variant is implicitly predicated on the success of transformations leading to a 
more child- and family-friendly society. 
Fertility-boosting population policy is a controversial topic in social sciences 
and policy making. France demonstrates that an array of pro-family and pro-child 
policies consistently implemented over a long period may be successful, resulting 
in an attained and sustained fertility level that is about half a child higher than in 
the lowest-low fertility countries. Similar lessons may be drawn from the family 
policies in the Nordic countries. Emulating these experiences is possible in 
principle, but this would involve mobilising considerable resources and, in some 
cases, promoting serious societal changes. Also, it would be imprudent to 
extrapolate the applicability of proven policies to further changes in reproductive 
behaviour intended to ascertain above-replacement fertility.  
A key issue in the population policy debate is the compatibility of childrearing 
with gainful employment. The experience of several European countries 
demonstrates that success depends not only on the availability of affordable child 
care services, but also on gender equality in the family and in the workplace. The 
European Commission recognises that families must be further encouraged by 
public policies that allow women and men to reconcile family life and work 
(European Commission 2005a). Where these conditions are not met, there are 
opportunities to build them, which may result in higher fertility.  
The case in point is Italy, where low labour market participation rates of 
married women coexist with low fertility. A likely explanation of this relationship Demographic and economic factors of labour supply 
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involves the Italian institutional structure, particularly as reflected in rigidities and 
imperfections of the labour market and characteristics of the publicly funded child 
care system. These rigidities tend to simultaneously increase the costs of having 
children and to discourage the economic activity of married women (Del Boca 
2002).  
Fertility differentials between the most and the least gender-equitable low-
fertility societies do not exceed half a child per woman but this gap is very 
substantial for demographic dynamics. The small part of it may eventually close 
itself due to the diminishing tempo effect, whereby previously postponed births 
take place. The larger part of the gap, however, results from so many complex 
factors and their interactions that at this point trying to encompass them all into 
comprehensive models seems to be an unrealistic enterprise. The hypotheses 
range from those that are overly optimistic (e.g. the approach underlying the 
demographic policies in the Russian Federation), to those that plainly refute the 
effectiveness of public interventions aimed at increasing fertility. For instance, 
recent findings demonstrate that even if all currently advocated family policies 
were introduced at once this would not necessarily lead to an increase in the 
number of births (Dorbritz 2004; van de Kaa 2006). This is partly due to the fact 
that in some societies, sub-replacement family size desires have already become 
entrenched in the young cohorts (Goldstein et al. 2003).  
Joining the trajectory of moderately increasing fertility would, even in an 
optimistic perspective, require significant restructuring in the societies where 
lowest-low fertility is deeply ingrained, i.e. in Germany and in Italy. Even if this 
were to happen—and all economic scenarios outlined above presume that it 
will—the negative demographic impacts of what has already come to pass on the 
labour force still cannot be prevented. By the mid-century, these impacts will 
grow so large that, bar a miraculous jump of fertility levels, only a combination of 
profound labour and immigration reforms will be able to prevent labour demand 
from shrinking by double-digit percentage points. A half-a-child disparity in the 
total fertility rate between France and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and 
Germany and Italy on the other, does account for a large part of the difference in 
WAP dynamics for the entire projection period. The improvements in labour 
force participation and labour utilisation, as well as larger streams of 
immigration—which in Germany and Italy should be done to compensate for 
demographic decline—could be transformed in France and the United Kingdom 
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